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ABSTRACT
The 2010–2012 euro crisis prompted a wave of institutional reforms in the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), and one of the most remarkable changes was the creation of a permanent bailout
facility for troubled sovereigns. The birth of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 was preceded
by harsh debates, reflecting a conflict between a German view of country-level responsibility and French-
Italian calls for more risk sharing. These tensions have remained ever since, which was also highlighted by
conflicts regarding the ESMs overhaul at the end of 2019. Concerns of Italy then drew attention to the fact
that a wide range of issues prevented the community from finalizing the post-crisis structure of the euro-
zone. This paper focuses on the evolution of the EMU financial assistance framework up until the latest
efforts for its reform. We analyse the impact of related policy announcements on changes in sovereign bond
yields of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (i.e. the most vulnerable countries during the euro crisis). Our
findings show that news on bailout arrangements significantly contributed to a contemporaneous moder-
ation of periphery bond yields, especially in the case of shorter maturities. This result hints at the role of
common facilities in supporting financial stability. To enhance this feature, a ‘package approach’ (i.e.
multiple reforms together, as stressed by Italy) may well need to be considered. Such a broad perspective can
help strengthen the euro area once the acute threat of the coronavirus pandemic is averted.
KEYWORDS
euro area, bailout, European Stability Mechanism, reform, Italy, bond yields
JEL-CODES
F34, F45, G12
p
Corresponding author E-mail: eszter.boros@uni-corvinus.hu
Society and Economy
DOI: 10.1556/204.2020.00024
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 12/03/20 04:51 PM UTC
1. INTRODUCTION
Tensions in Italy in December 2019 revealed concerns about one of the ongoing institutional
reforms of the euro area. Doubts over the intended changes in the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) were voiced by Italy in the final phase of approval. This sheds light on a deeper
disagreement among EMU members on the directions that key reforms should take. The debate
on the ESM overhaul is all the more crucial as this reform could be one of the few major
institutional changes completed since 2014. The new coronavirus crisis, the most recent episode
in the history of European crisis management may also draw attention to the importance of
sound common action.
As the debate on the ESM can be a turning point, we deem it essential to review the ESMs
‘track record’ in contributing to financial stability. This issue is closely related to sovereign bond
markets, not just because the ESM is mandated to assist states, but also because Italian critics of
the reform envisaged a rise in bond yields. (Concerns were related to changes which would make
debt restructuring easier.)
Hence, our paper seeks to examine the relationship between government bond yields and
bailout-/ESM-related events since the onset of the euro crisis in 2010. Specifically, we investigate
whether announcements about rescue funds impacted contemporaneous market sentiments, i.e.
whether they prompted immediate changes in periphery bond yields. (As conventional in the
literature, the term ‘periphery’ is used to refer to the Mediterranean member states and Ireland.
These sovereigns are of special interest as they suffered the largest spikes in bond yields during
the euro crisis.) This research can help reveal whether the creation and usage of the new bailout
facilities could contribute to avert threats to financial stability in the euro area at critical mo-
ments.
Applying an event study approach, we create an event set which includes announcements
about the EMU bailout framework, along with actual cases of financial assistance. This event set
is then used in panel regressions to check its possible impact on yields of periphery bonds with
different maturities. As we seek to reveal prompt market reactions, we choose to analyse 3-day
time periods for each event. Other factors effective in these periods are controlled by different
macro indices and variables. Robustness checks are also carried out.
Our results suggest that ESM-related events had a significant negative impact on contem-
poraneous yields. This finding might indicate the overall stabilizing role of EMU bailout ar-
rangements. The result may serve as a common ground for debates on ESM settings as well as
on a set of broader financial reforms. These discussions might end up with the conclusion that a
wider range of parallel changes is necessary to preserve the advantages of the ESM. Our
contribution to this debate can be regarded as new especially in terms of its coverage of ESM-
related events. Namely, we do not only examine bailouts themselves, but a broad array of an-
nouncements about the related institutional progress.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides background with a focus on moti-
vations leading up to the creation and reform of the ESM. Our interpretation aims to understand
the possible role of bailouts in the context of a monetary union and also to spot the key events as
a basis for our detailed event set. Chapter 3 describes this set, along with the methodology, data
and variables used to produce model outputs. Results and limitations are discussed subse-
quently. Chapter 4 concludes and adds an outlook highlighting the connection between EMU
reforms and the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic.
2 Society and Economy
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 12/03/20 04:51 PM UTC
2. THE EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM: BACKGROUND, CREATION
AND REFORM
Like all major changes in the EMUs institutional architecture during the last couple of years, the
creation of a common bailout fund was also triggered by the euro crisis. At the time when
Greece’s severe debt problem quickly raised market tensions in 2010, the euro area had neither
any crisis management functions or framework, nor dedicated financial resources to assist its
troubled members. In fact, up until the crisis, several years had passed in the belief that sov-
ereigns in a monetary union could not go bankrupt (Benczes 2011; Suranyi 2012), if for no other
reason than because their peers would help them ‘get through’. This view was not only out of
line with the ‘no-bailout clause’ enshrined in EU treaties, it was also inconsistent with the lack of
a proper ‘lender of last resort’ function on the part of the European Central Bank (ECB) (see De
Grauwe 2012; 2013). Nonetheless, the introduction of the euro prompted a substantial reduction
in perceived risks, compressing bond spreads for all member countries. This kind of euro-related
confidence, together with several macro and policy factors (e.g. ample liquidity in global
financial markets, excessive risk-taking), contributed to a prolonged period in which EMU
sovereigns could borrow at historically low interest rates. Some of them (Greece and Italy) went
on piling up huge debts during the 2000s. In other cases, like Spain and Ireland, private debts
increased and ultimately became a ‘contingent liability’ of sovereigns, in an embrace between
banks and states (Acharya et al. 2014). Credit was mostly channelled to domestic consumption
and the real estate sector, fuelling asset price bubbles. Thus, burgeoning debts did not come with
a similar rise in productivity, which resulted in a loss of competitiveness, and consequently,
rising current account deficits of the periphery (see e.g. Strauch et al. 2016).
Market sentiments then drastically changed in late 2009 when these intra-EMU imbalances
were put under the spotlight (Giordano et al. 2013; Schwendner et al. 2015). Yields of the
Mediterranean states and Ireland soared, not least because prospects of any bailout or fresh
liquidity seemed totally uncertain. Anxiety was fuelled by the perception of an extremely fragile
EMU framework (Verdun 2015), which left sovereigns without any backstop for their debts akin
to foreign exchange liabilities. As De Grauwe (2012, 2013) points out, membership in a mon-
etary union involves losing full control of the legal tender. In other words, there is not even an
implicit guarantee that money will always be available to pay off creditors. This is because the
influence on money supply is in the hands of the single central bank of the currency area,
allowing no substantive room for unilateral action. In contrast, ‘standalone’ states can practically
repay any amounts of debts denominated in their own currency at any time.1 This of course
does not mean that a sovereign default is impossible in this case. (A state in serious trouble
would ultimately default on its foreign liabilities and lose access to foreign markets.) Never-
theless, at certain critical moments (like those in 2010 and thereafter), the ability for limitless
debt service may make a difference from the viewpoint of investors (see Mehrling 2000 for a
discussion on this).
Regarding the sudden stop of market financing in 2010, the problem was not merely that
countries in distress had no room for creating euros on their own. Rather, it was about their
1Certainly, monetary financing is prohibited in many countries. However, this is ultimately a legal ban which can be
practically ‘circumvented’ or neglected in cases of emergency.
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inability to apply for any last resort (any funds most generally). Neither the ECB nor any other
institution were mandated to fulfil such a role (De Grauwe 2012; 2013; Suranyi 2012). As regards
banks, access to emergency liquidity was possible, but uncertain because it was conditional on
ECB action. Note that we do not argue that the spike in periphery bond yields was only
attributed to a missing ‘lender of last resort’ or a deficient institutional framework more broadly.
The underlying macro foundations of the troubled countries were certainly poor. It is just
suggested here that the pace and amplitude of market reactions were aggravated by the poor
architecture of the euro.
As regards an unlimited last resort, it was not until 2012 that the ECB decided to perform
such a role. After some previous purchases limited in size and time, the central bank announced
to commit itself to infinite intervention in sovereign bond markets. This was hallmarked by the
speech of ECB President Mario Draghi who promised to do ‘whatever it takes to preserve the
euro’ (Draghi 2012). Through the subsequent Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program,
the ECB practically offered to act as a ‘lender of last resort’ for sovereigns (albeit it did not buy
any bonds under the OMT framework, see Strauch et al. 2016). Following the OMT commit-
ment, periphery bond spreads returned to moderate levels, with occasional spikes only (such as
in 2015 amid the third phase of the Greek turmoil). The moderation, however, did not come
without a price tag in a political sense. Related debates about risk sharing and intra-area
‘transfers’ were well on the rise. Due to this controversy, the OMT program soon found itself
before the German Federal Constitutional Court, being challenged as violating the ban on
monetary financing (Varnay 2017). (German reservations were later rejected by the European
Court of Justice which acknowledged that the OMT was needed to maintain an effective
monetary policy transmission.)
The OMT provides two key insights for our paper. First, it highlights the differences between
a German and a French–Italian stance on risk sharing. Benassy-Quere et al. 2018 show that
Germany, along with the Netherlands and Austria, stresses country-level responsibility and a
fear of moral hazard. From this point of view, common financial arrangements and backstops
would encourage irresponsible behaviour (e.g. excessive debts) to the detriment of EMU peers.
In contrast, other countries led by France, Italy and Spain argue that more risk sharing and
stronger cooperation at the union level are necessary to maintain financial stability.
The second ‘takeaway’ of the OMT is that last resort must be literally unlimited. Capped
commitments, such as early interventions by the ECB may not be suited to calm markets, espe-
cially in a longer-term perspective. At the beginning of the euro crisis, the introduction of un-
conventional monetary policy tools was initially limited to maintaining liquidity in the eurosystem
and providing long-term financing to EMU banks. Many authors argue that unconventional
measures had a significant immediate impact on government bond yields, but in the longer run,
capped programs like the Securities Markets Program (SMP) did not provide a long-term solution
(Chang – Leblond 2015; Falagiarda – Reitz 2015; Kilponen et al. 2012). Subsequent asset-pur-
chasing schemes, such as the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) and the Asset Purchase
Program (APP) were then extended to the entire eurozone, not only the troubled countries.
Such finite backstops may play a key role in the short run, i.e. at critical moments. However, at
the onset of the euro crisis, member states could not resort to either dedicated funds for bailouts or
any comprehensive crisis management tools. Disagreement on these issues was strong, and ten-
sions have been leaving a mark on the evolution of bailout policies ever since. At start, there was
no shared understanding on what a ‘bailout’ could mean in the EMU framework at all.
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(Remember the ‘no bailout clause’ which excludes transfers among members.) In the meantime,
however, the bankruptcy of one or more member states threatened with ‘the mother of all financial
crises’ (Eichengreen 2010). The situation was further aggravated by the fact that no procedure had
been laid down for exiting the monetary union, either. Indeed, membership had been meant to be
irreversible (De Grauwe 2018). When a Greek exit started to emerge as a possible option, it was
likely to generate unbearable economic and political costs (Eichengreen 2010).
All this market panic forced EMU leaders to come up with bailout packages, providing direct
funds for troubled countries. Controversy on financial assistance, however, first caused them to
envisage ad hoc commitments only (February 2010). This was well before the realization that a
comprehensive framework and the use of the ECBs unlimited intervention power are un-
avoidable (De Grauwe 2012). A one-time lifebelt for Greece in May 2010 (a loan with strict
conditionality, through the ad hoc Greek Loan Facility) could actually be regarded as being in
line with the ‘no bailout’ rule (Micossi et al. 2011; Verdun 2015). For Germany, it could seem
well-constrained while also well-suited to stop contagion threatening with bringing down
German banks as well. But after a while, bond yields signalled that markets would not be calmed
by such a standalone solution. The approach had to be scaled up as soon as the Greek rescue
package was signed in May 2010. Thus, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was
created as a temporary vehicle granting emergency credit to troubled sovereigns (up until 2013)
(Verdun 2015). The EFSF framework included V60 billion in loans and credit lines to be
provided by the EU budget and further bilateral credit guarantees by members up to V440
billion. (The former amount is also known as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
or shortly, EFSM.) Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) granted a contribution of
V250 billion (Christova 2011; Gocaj – Meunier 2013). Guarantees were provided by member
states on a pro-rata basis, according to their ECB capital keys. This meant that Germany became
the biggest potential contributor, able to set the parameters of the institution. The EFSF issued
bonds in financial markets to finance bailout commitments. These securities gained high credit
rating thanks to the underlying state guarantees with Germany in the first place. Subsequently,
the EFSF extended loans to Ireland and Portugal in 2011. Assistance came with widely criticized
austerity-based ‘reform programs’ and near market-interest rates. This was largely due to the
fact that Germany wanted to make sure assistance was not a ‘subsidy’, and no ‘Eurobond’ was
created (Gocaj – Meunier 2013; Verdun 2015).2 EFSF principles and procedures drew upon
those of the IMF which, along with IMF participation, seemed to be an appropriate ‘deterrent’ to
rule out moral hazard (Pisani-Ferry 2010).
Albeit not unlimited (like an ECB intervention could be), this temporary rescue vehicle was
supposed to put an end to market tensions. However, following some favourable reactions,
concerns returned due to the actual size of the fund, especially the amount of money readily
2‘Eurobond’ refers to a hypothetical mutual debt obligation which EMU members could issue jointly to finance state
budgets. Proposals to create such bonds have been common since the start of the euro crisis. See for example Delpla –
Weizs€acker (2010) or a recent suggestion by nine EMU countries to introduce a ‘coronabond’ as a response to the
catastrophe caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (RTE 2020).
Common bonds, if formally created, would have had lower yields compared to those of periphery sovereign bonds
during the 2010–2012 euro crisis. Bonds of EMU bailout funds could be regarded as some kind of a ‘Eurobond’ (a
mutual contingent liability), but sizeable gains in interest rates were not passed on to the troubled countries. Instead,
loans were extended at rather punitive rates to avoid ‘moral hazard’ (‘transfers’) in the first place.
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available (i.e. not only guaranteed). ‘The EU was once again grossly underprepared to deal with
the burgeoning crisis’ (Gocaj – Meunier 2013:247; see also Benczes 2011). Therefore, in March
2011, the European Council decided to establish a permanent stability mechanism, the ESM,
replacing the EFSF from 2013 onwards (Verdun 2015). The ESMs lending capacity was set to
V500 billion. Most of its subscribed capital came in the form of guarantees and ‘callable capital’,
besides a paid-in part of V80 billion (Manasse 2011; Minenna – Aversa 2019). That is, a
guarantee-based approach was maintained, along with the size of the overall rescue capacity. An
innovation compared to the previous EFSF setting was the concept of private sector involvement
(Christova 2011). It was envisaged so that in case of irreversible debt dynamics, the recipient
state would have to start renegotiating its debts with private creditors. Although such an
outcome remained very unlikely (as it was conditional on an official declaration of unsustain-
ability by EU institutions), some further steps were taken to make way for private involvement.
Since 2013, so-called Collective Action Clauses (CACs) have been included in new government
securities with a maturity over 1 year, issued by any member state (ESM 2020a). These CACs
foresee that a change in bond terms (such as restructuring) can happen if approved by a
qualified majority of creditors at the levels of each bond series and all series combined.
In terms of tools, the ESM was at the start mandated to extend loans (with strict condi-
tionality), and also to buy government bonds in primary markets (up to 50% of the final issued
amount to reduce the risk of a failed auction) (ESM 2020b). Interest rates of loans were
decreased to some extent (by 100 basis points). Shortly after its creation, the ESMs powers were
extended in July 2011, allowing the institution to recapitalize banks and make purchases in
secondary markets (Christova 2011). The former tool was used to rescue Spanish banks in 2012,
and Cyprus also entered a program thereafter in 2013. Apart from loans and indirect bank
recapitalization, no other instruments have been used yet (ESM 2020b).
As it can be seen from the above, markets indeed pushed EMU leaders to adopt more far-
reaching bailout solutions amid a sustained euro area debt crisis. Schwendner et al. (2015) argue
that a consolidation in sovereign bond markets3 can be attributed to the new rescue mecha-
nisms. Similar conclusions are drawn by Kiss et al. (2019) who find that EFSF/ESM loans
contributed to the observed decline in yield premia in the aftermath of the euro crisis. In
contrast, G€odl and Kleinert (2016) establish that announcements of financial assistance and
fiscal measures (as conditions of rescue packages) prompted no significant change in periphery
bond yields (except for Ireland). These authors parallelly find that other events had significant
effects (e.g. ECB action and separate country-specific episodes like the Greek ‘haircut’ in 2012).
Changes in yields are the key focus of this paper. Our findings are presented in the next chapter,
based on an event set covering the evolution of EMU bailout funds.
A recent debate about the ESM is related to its latest reform. At the end of 2019, Italy announced
that it would seek changes in the approach regarding the amendment of the ESM Treaty, which had
come to the last phase of approval (Fonte – Jones 2019; ANSA 2019). It is essentially this turmoil
which has directed our attention to the ESM and its overhaul. The situation, resembling a deadlock,
namely points to the fact that meaningful EMU reforms have stalled since 2014, due to different
visions of the member states (Benassy-Quere et al., 2018; Minenna and Aversa, 2019). Italy’s key fear
is that new ESM rules may raise its debt servicing costs. Such an outcome would certainly hurt Italy,
3The end of negative correlations between daily changes of yields of core versus periphery countries.
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whose public debt-to-GDP ratio is the second largest in the euro area, at 137% in the third quarter of
2019 according to Eurostat (2020) data, surpassed only by a Greek ratio of 178%. We close this
chapter by reviewing the reform and the potential rationale for Italian doubts.
Changes in the ESM framework were initiated a couple of years ago when proposals like a non-
paper by then German Finance Minister Wolfgang Sch€auble (2017) raised the question of debt
restructuring. Sch€auble suggested that ESM assistance should come with an automatic extension of
bond maturities of the recipient state. Moreover, a mandatory debt restructuring mechanism
should be laid down and used, if necessary, to restore debt sustainability. The non-paper also
points to the need to modify CACs to facilitate private sector involvement in risk sharing.
Despite such proposals, current revisions do not include an automatic obligatory restruc-
turing as a condition for ESM help (ESM 2020a). Amendments of CACs have, however, become
a part of the reform, and these must be the main source of Italian concerns about rising yields.
Current CACs are so-called ‘double-limb CACs’. As already mentioned, they require two
separate majorities to approve a change in bond terms: one at the level of each series and one at
the level of all series combined (ESM 2020a). This feature benefits ‘holdout’ investors who can
block a debt restructuring by acquiring majority in a single series. Similar CACs have caused
misery during the 2012 Greek haircut when debt burdens from 18 series (out of 35) could not be
eased due to ‘holdout’ investors (Benassy-Quere et al. 2018).
To prevent such an outcome, ‘single-limb’ CACs are envisaged by the reform. These ‘allow
the majority vote to take place at the level of all (. . .) series combined, without the need for a
majority at the level of the holders of each individual series’ (ESM 2020a). The amendment
makes debt restructuring (if needed) clearly easier. This can, in turn, decrease the attractiveness
of government bonds, especially in the case of highly indebted sovereigns like Italy. Italian critics
argue that higher yields will follow, making it ‘more likely that Italy will have to restructure or
even default on its debt’ (Fonte – Jones 2019). Note, however, that a reverse interpretation would
also make sense as an easier debt restructuring might favour investors as well. Most bondholders
would be ‘happy’ with securing a deal smoothly if that were the only way to get any payments (to
minimize inevitable losses). Still, from a forward-looking perspective, fewer chances for strategic
behaviour (less bargaining power) may discourage investors, especially bigger ones. Actual
market reactions are checked in the next chapter.
Other key points of the ESM reform include a backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF)
and enhancing the effectiveness of precautionary credit lines (PCLs) (Howarth – Spendzharova
2019; Bauer – Herz 2020). A pillar of the banking union, the SRF is an EMU-level fund for the
resolution of failing banks. Granting a backstop is aimed at strengthening its stabilization func-
tion. Notwithstanding, such a commitment will necessarily put a strain on the resources of the
ESM, even though potential ESM loans are capped (ESM 2020a). As regards PCLs, the innovation
lies in more standardization. PCL requests will be processed on the basis of standardized eligibility
criteria, increasing speed and transparency. To the best of our knowledge, neither the backstop
function nor the change in PCLs have been challenged by recent Italian critics.
Italy’s reservations have had a remarkable impact on the approval process. Although in
December 2019, the Eurogroup agreed in principle on a revised ESM Treaty text, its final adoption
by national parliaments was postponed (originally until spring 2020). It was not by accident that in
January 2020, Eurogroup President Mario Centeno hinted at the importance of a ‘package
approach’ (Centeno 2020a). Italy namely stressed that such a solution could make the ongoing
ESM reform more feasible. A ‘package’ here refers to the need for advancing other reforms
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parallelly. An EMU-wide bank deposit guarantee, a common unemployment insurance scheme
and progress on a eurozone budget are among those preferred by Italy (Fonte – Jones 2019).
However, these plans are much less advanced as they continue to prompt even more disagreement
among the members. At the time of writing this paper, EMU states are temporarily ‘exempted’
from solving this particular impasse on ESM as the coronavirus outbreak has rewritten the agenda.
Final agreement on the reform has been postponed indefinitely (Centeno 2020b).
After long talks, EU leaders in July 2020 agreed on the new budget of the union and further
funds to deal with the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. In total, these arrangements will
provide the community with V750 billion in grants and loans, and most importantly, the money
will also be raised by the European Commission as a joint obligation of the member states (ET
2020). The agreement came after cut-throat debates, largely driven by the ‘frugal four’
(Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden) who firmly opposed the idea of mutualized debt
(Politico 2020). Time will tell whether the package can relieve the disappointment of Italy and
other hard-hit countries over European solidarity. The pandemic also puts the post-2010
institutional reforms to a special test.
In what follows, we examine whether policy steps shaping the EMU bailout framework had
an impact on sovereign bond yields in the eurozone periphery after the onset of the debt crisis.
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the empirical part of our paper, we analyse the impact of EFSF/ESM-related policy an-
nouncements on government bond yields in the periphery. To do so, we create a panel
comprising Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (i 5 4) over the period 2010–2020. We disregard
Greece because of a notable shrinkage in its marketable debt, implying a less reliable reflection of
investor sentiment. We assess market reactions by employing an event study approach,
explaining the change in bond yields in the panel with an event dummy for our event set.
3.1. Data and variables
We use benchmark government bond yields on different maturities (1, 5 and 10 years).
Benchmark yields enable us to compare roughly similar securities in terms of maturity, although
the shift from one bond to another as benchmark might lead to an unexplained rise in yields.
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the respective yields since the start of the euro crisis. It depicts the
extraordinary increase during the turmoil and the subsequent moderation (as discussed in
Chapter 2). Daily observations cover every working day between January 2010 and January 2020
(t 5 2,625, implying a total number of data points of N 5 10,500).4
Yields in our dataset are not stationary. Thus, we calculate first differences, i.e. daily changes
of yields (dyield) for each maturity. Augmented Dickey–Fuller tests show that these new time
series contain no unit roots. First differences eliminate the problem of changing benchmarks as
well, given that any unexplained rise due to such shifts becomes less apparent. Furthermore,
using first differences later allows us to disregard fundamental determinants of yields which do
not change in the very short run (G€odl – Kleinert 2016).
4There are no data on bonds with 1-year maturity for Spain up until 8 August 2011 as no benchmark yields are provided
by Bloomberg in this case, and no other bonds could be used as a substitute, either.
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Fig. 1. Government bond yields (1, 5 and 10-year maturities) and dates of events.
Source: authors, based on Bloomberg
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For model calculations, we create a set of announcements related to EFSF/ESM. This set
embodies the dynamics of policy developments discussed in Chapter 2. That is, it covers all
relevant institutional changes and actions, ranging from early indications of a bailout scheme in
2010 up until the 2018–2019 reform. In total, we consider 29 events as shown in Fig. 1. (See
Annex for a detailed list.) Note that the set does not contain country-specific fiscal an-
nouncements and ECB decisions as these are not directly connected to our scope. Possible ef-
fects of such events are captured by control variables discussed below.
We create a dummy variable for our event set (Events). It equals to 1 on the days of the
announcements as well as on the days preceding and following them. On all other days, the
value of the dummy is 0. Surrounding days are taken into account as anticipated and lagged
effects are more likely to be captured this way. That is, we measure the potential contempo-
raneous impact of selected events on yields in 3-day ‘time windows’.
As for control variables, we collect several indicators, some of which have different values for
each periphery country, while others are common indicators. We start with 3 country-specific
indicators: uncertainty index (Unc_index), Bloomberg political risk index (BBG_pol_risk) and
periphery Credit Default Swap (CDS) data (PER_CDS), all provided by Bloomberg. Note that we
use 5-year contracts for CDS in the case of each bond maturity as others were not liquid at all
times for all countries. In order to proxy underlying euro area processes and global risk sen-
timents, we select 7 common variables. These are the following: CBOE Volatility index,
commonly referred as VIX index (VIX_index), Citi macro risk indicator (Citi_macro), Citi
short-term indicator (Citi_short) and Citi inflation (CPI) surprise index (Citi_CPI) for the
eurozone, along with EU uncertainty index (EU_unc_index). In addition, German benchmark
yields of the respective maturities (Ger_XY) and the so-called ‘inflation breakevens’ (CPI_-
breakeven) are added. The former is regarded as the ‘risk-free’ rate. The latter embodies in-
formation about the market pricing of inflation-linked bonds, i.e. it signals changing market
perceptions of future inflation rates. In the case of daily data, first differences are used (in
accordance with the time series of bond yields), while monthly indicators, such as Citi-indices,
political risk and uncertainty indices, remain unchanged.
As an indicative robustness check, we resort to the ‘popularity’ of Google keywords ‘EFSF/
ESM’. This may help us double-check if there was increased attention to bailout funds in the
respective periods (which in turn could have contributed to the observed changes in bond
yields). We rely on Google’s own scale for measuring ‘popularity’. (The scale ranges from 1 to
100, with higher values indicating more searches for a keyword. The underlying methodology is
accepted for the purposes of this paper.) As ‘popularity’ of these words potentially overlaps, we
use the form ‘ESM OR EFSF’ in the first place, but we look at separate popularity indices, as well.
Note, however, that values are only available on a monthly basis, so differences in the case of
consecutive events within the same month are not reflected.
3.2. Model
In the literature, modelling the impact of policy announcements is common as it may be inter-
preted easily, even though the method is quite limited in capturing longer-term effects. Our model
is based on Falagiarda and Reitz (2015). These authors employed a similar set of panel data to
examine the impact of the ECBs quantitative easing programs. They compared the so-called ‘event
days’ with the rest of the trading days by applying an event dummy in a linear regression. While
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their event set was built to measure the relative importance of unconventional monetary policy
measures introduced by the ECB, we applied this method to events related to EFSF/ESM.
Thus, we estimate the following model (Eq. (1)):
dyieldi;t ¼ aþ b1Eventst þ b2X þ b3Z þ «i;t (1)
where dyield is the first difference of the respective government bond yield of country i at time t.
We repeat the same regression for each maturity. Remember that Events is a dummy for EFSF/
ESM announcements as described earlier. This is a common variable with the same events for all
countries in our panel. X and Z are sets of control variables, with X being country-specific, while
Z not. X includes PER_CDS, Unc_index and BBG_pol_risk, and Z comprises the rest of our
control variables. (First differences are applied in the case of daily data. As part of Z, German
yields are of the same maturity as periphery yields in the respective equation.) Intercept a is
common for all countries (Chow test shows that no country-specific fixed effects are needed in
the model).5 Finally, « denotes the error term.
Our approach is similar to that of G€odl and Kleinert (2016) and Kiss et al. (2019) as both
studies apply variations of the event study method and regressions with dummies related to
EFSF/ESM. Nonetheless, we resort to a single, more detailed and comprehensive event set
covering the evolution of bailout policies. This goes beyond focussing exclusively on the fact
whether financial assistance was received by a country or not (Kiss et al. 2019). We also
overcome limitations arising from a very small number of events of separate types, and we pool
announcements about EMU bailout funds exclusively (two features different from G€odl and
Kleinert (2016)).
3.3.. Results and discussion
Our estimations show that the announcements had a significant negative impact on the daily
change in bond yields of EMU periphery countries between January 2010 and 2020 (Tables 1–3).
In other words, news about the European bailout funds tended to contribute to the moderation of
contemporaneous sovereign yields in the periphery after the outbreak of the euro crisis. After
several iterations, we omitted most macro indices as they did not improve the explanatory power
of the models. Thus, the final models include the daily change in the CDS price of the respective
periphery country and the daily changes in the VIX index and the benchmark German govern-
ment bond yields. The latter two proxy variables allow us to capture global, regional trends
affecting yields, while CDS is supposed to reflect perceptions of default risk.
In the case of 1-year government bond yields, we find that the Events dummy is significant at
every conventional significance level (P < 1%). Therefore, we may establish that EFSF/ESM
announcements significantly decreased daily differences of 1-year sovereign yields within the 3-
day ‘time windows’, by approximately 5 basis points on average each time. This practically
means that news on bailout funds helped to avert further rises in periphery yields or contributed
to their decrease on the surrounding days. Thus, markets seem to have reacted positively (at
least) in the short run. As regards our control variables, it is interesting to look at the change in
1-year German yields: a negative coefficient suggests that yields of the periphery and Germany
5Note that if Events turns out to be significant, dyield is shifted (ceteris paribus) on those days which are in a 3-day ‘time
window’ (i.e. if Events 5 1). This technically implies (a þ b1) as the intercept, but a itself is time-invariant.
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were negatively correlated in the last 10 years. This points to the role of German securities as
‘safe assets’ which investors rush to buy in times of turmoil in the EMU periphery.
Regarding 5-year yields, the Events dummy also proves to be significant at a 1% level.
Nonetheless, the estimated coefficient is smaller. In the case of 10-year bonds, the dummy is
Table 2. Panel output 2: Impacts of EFSF/ESM-related events on periphery bond yields on 5-year
maturity
Dependent variable: dyield_5Y
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-Ratio P-value
constant 0.001 0.001 0.543 0.588
Events 0.024 0.008 3.110 0.002***
d_PER_CDS 0.001 0.000 26.231 <2.2e16***
d_VIX_index 0.005 0.001 6.801 1.097e11***
d_GER_5Y 0.127 0.034 3.766 1.671e4***
N 5 10,500, F-statistic: 216.97, P-value: <2.22e16***, R-square: 0.08.
Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05.
Notes: dyield_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of the respective periphery state; Events: dummy
for the EFSF/ESM-specific event set (1 for the day of an announcement, the preceding and the following day,
0 otherwise); d_PER_CDS: daily change in CDS of the respective periphery state; d_VIX_index: daily change in
VIX index; d_GER_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of Germany.
Source: authors.
Table 1. Panel output 1: Impacts of EFSF/ESM-related events on periphery bond yields on 1-year
maturity
Dependent variable: dyield_1Y
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-Ratio P-value
constant 0.000 0.002 0.055 0.956
Events 0.046 0.011 4.165 3.147e05***
d_PER_CDS 0.001 0.000 15.848 <2.2e16***
d_VIX_index 0.004 0.001 3.173 0.002***
d_GER_1Y 0.475 0.095 5.006 5.642e07***
N 5 10,500, F-statistic: 85.55, P-value: <2.22e16*** R-square: 0.03.
Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05.
Notes: dyield_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of the respective periphery state; Events: dummy
for the EFSF/ESM-specific event set (1 for the day of an announcement, the preceding and the following day,
0 otherwise); d_PER_CDS: daily change in CDS of the respective periphery state; d_VIX_index: daily change in
VIX index; d_GER_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of Germany.
Source: authors.
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again significant at a threshold close to 1%. The impact is the smallest in this case: we may
identify a 1-basis point average decline attributed to our events. In sum, we can conclude that
EFSF/ESM-related announcements came with a contemporaneous moderation in periphery
bond yields in the aftermath of the euro crisis. The coefficient of German yields (d_GER_XY)
remained negative in the case of 5-year maturities, but interestingly, it switched to positive for
10-year bonds. This may reveal that the role of German bonds as a ‘safe asset’ is most evident in
the short to medium term, while long-term maturities tend to reflect expectations of intra-EMU
convergence.
Note that our conclusions do not change if we only use the events of the most turbulent times
of the euro crisis (i.e. 2010–2013, see Events 1–22 in Annex). This iteration allows us to check the
impact of the core institutional progress (up until the ESM commenced its operations), with no
regard to the recent reform. Table 4 sums up the coefficients of Events for this shorter period of
Table 3. Panel output 3: Impacts of EFSF/ESM-related events on periphery bond yields on 10-year
maturity
Dependent variable: dyield_10Y
Variables Coefficient Std. error t-Ratio P-value
constant 0.001 0.001 0.983 0.326
Events 0.014 0.006 2.464 0.014**
d_PER_CDS 0.001 0.000 26.839 <2.2e16***
d_VIX_index 0.006 0.001 10.232 <2.2e16***
d_GER_10Y 0.132 0.023 5.752 9.054e09***
N 5 10,500, F-statistic: 216.29, P-value: <2.22e16***, R-square: 0.08.
Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05.
Notes: dyield_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of the respective periphery state; Events: dummy
for the EFSF/ESM-specific event set (1 for the day of an announcement, the preceding and the following day,
0 otherwise); d_PER_CDS: daily change in CDS of the respective periphery state; d_VIX_index: daily change in
VIX index; d_GER_XY: daily change in bond yields (X-year maturity) of Germany.
Source: authors.
Table 4. Coefficients of events dummy using a reduced event set (2010–2013)
Maturity Coefficient P-value
1-year 0.061 0.008***
5-year 0.031 0.029**
10-year 0.019 0.059
Notes: Pooled models (N 5 3,636). Estimation of Equation (1) for each maturity using a reduced event set
(Events 1–22 in Annex) and the same control variables as given in Tables 1–3.
Source: authors.
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time. Results show that until mid-2013, events related to the EMU bailout funds had even slightly
stronger impacts on bond yields, especially in the case of 1-year maturity.
Although the overall explanatory power of our models could be upgraded, this is not key
here insofar as our Events dummy is significant even together with strong indicators of default
risk and market uncertainty (as control variables). So, we deem that our results provide useful
insights, especially what regards different maturities. According to the literature, short-term
yields are more likely to be affected by market sentiments and expectations about monetary
policy decisions, while long-term yields reflect long-run structural factors. The latter are also
more likely to be influenced by quantitative easing programs, by nature. These stylised facts are
reflected in our results as well. Our outputs suggest that markets were calmed by EFSF/ESM
announcements mostly in the case of shorter maturities. This is also in line with the background
described in Chapter 2. It can thus be assumed that policy steps leading up to the creation and
usage of capped funds were judged by markets mostly as a temporary fix. That is, investor
confidence returned in the case of short-term periphery bonds, but they were less convinced that
changes at hand would help to end divergence among eurozone countries in the long run. This
may be due to the incremental and largely uncertain nature of the institutional progress, along
with doubts on the overall size and structure of the dedicated funds. An alternative explanation
is that the ECBs QE programs may have muted the impact of the institutional changes in the
case of 10-year maturities.
Regarding the robustness of our results in Tables 1–3, we carry out two types of alternative
estimations. First, choosing and rotating different sets of the control variables do not change the
significance levels (P-values) of the Events dummy in a sizable manner, on either of the ma-
turities involved. Coefficients remain negative and they do not change substantially. Second, we
substitute the event set with Google popularity statistics, and we find that ‘popularities’ of EFSF
and ESM keywords prove to be significant. It is a thought-provoking result, raising questions
that go beyond the scope of our paper (e.g. how market sentiments are indeed reflected in
Google searches). Nevertheless, we argue that this alternative outcome confirms our results,
namely that markets reacted positively to the news on EFSF/ESM. Put otherwise, the observed
moderation in periphery bond yields is less likely to be attributable to an unknown, omitted
variable. This is because searches for EFSF/ESM must have been prompted by actual events, and
delivered information about additional funds for troubled EMU member states.
As for the evolution of yields between November 2019 and January 2020, Italian concerns
about the ESM overhaul seem not to be underpinned. That is, we could not observe an obvious
unilateral rise in sovereign bond yields for Italy (neither for Greece with similarly high debts).
This can be due to the fact that the ESM reform does not include an automatic obligatory debt
restructuring as a condition for financial assistance. Although the modification of CACs can be
regarded as disadvantageous for private investors in future cases, Italian fears of capital flight did
not come true during the period of the debate.
Our results are in line with those of Schwendner et al. (2015) and Kiss et al. (2019) as we also
find that the EFSF/ESM played a significant role in decreasing periphery bond yields, at least
what regards prompt market reactions. Our finding adds to the literature by demonstrating that
the significant relationship can also be established when considering a broad set of EFSF/ESM-
related events (not only disbursements of bailout loans themselves). This result may be a
common ground for further debates on the ESM. That is, any proposals should be assessed on
the basis of whether they help preserve the contribution of the ESM to financial stability.
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3.4. Limitations
Our methodology has the usual limitations of event study methods, which do not allow assessing
longer-term impacts of events and are not suited to uncover connections between explanatory
variables. Therefore, we could just offer limited insights into the underlying factors of the
evolution of periphery bond yields. As suggested earlier, a lasting moderation after 2012 could
mostly result from ECB policies, i.e. quantitative easing, which practically offered unlimited last
resort for members in need. However, this paper had a short-term empirical focus as it sought to
investigate contemporaneous market reactions to the creation and usage of EMU rescue funds.
These short-term insights are also relevant from a financial stability perspective.
In addition, note that event study outcomes may be sensitive to changes in the event set. In
this paper, we strove to reach a reasonable coverage of EFSF/ESM-related events.
We shall add two further remarks to the regressions above. First, as we have just noted, the
persistence of the impact could not be handled in this type of model. Other factors also influence
bond yields, such as particular data releases, deterioration in investment environment or
business confidence, changes in domestic policies, shifts in the global economy, etc. That is, the
direct effects of announcements examined in this paper are likely to disappear after a couple of
days. According to our calculations for the event set used in this paper, the effect lasted on
average for 2–4 days after the announcement, with little heterogeneity in the different countries
(2 days in Italy, 3 in Portugal, Spain and Ireland). (In this respect, the date of disappearance is
the first day when the yield rose for the first time after the announcement.)
Second, although the institutional reform of the ESM received serious criticism from some
Italian politicians at the end of 2019, we had few data points to assess these statements alone.
Thus, we could only provide a qualitative assessment as part of our paper’s broader context.
With more hindsight, however, the impacts of the reform (including the introduction of ‘single-
limb’ CACs) can be evaluated separately in the future. A question whether new CACs provoke
higher yields in times of market turbulence could only be answered later, too.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the relationship between policy announcements about the EMU bailout
framework and contemporaneous sovereign bond yields. The relevance of the topic is under-
lined by concerns about the recent ESM overhaul. As in December 2019, Italy (one of the most
indebted countries of the euro area) voiced fears of a resulting increase in its bond yields, the
larger issue of pending EMU reforms came under the spotlight again.
Therefore, we deemed it essential to investigate the background of the concerns and more
broadly, the role of Europe’s bailout arrangements in affecting sovereign yields. An event study
approach and panel regressions were applied for this purpose. Our aim was to create a
comprehensive set of major EFSF/ESM-related events after the outbreak of the euro crisis. To
that end, we reviewed the process leading up to the creation of a permanent bailout fund for the
eurozone (the ESM), highlighting different views of two groups of member states on intra-area
risk sharing. At the onset of the crisis, the currency union lacked a common framework and
funds for financial assistance to its members. Soaring periphery bond yields then forced the
EMU to take action, and among other steps, a bailout fund (with a capped lending capacity of
V500 million) was created and entrusted with certain intervention powers. Our event set took
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stock of the related institutional progress and ‘rescue loans’ extended to distressed countries.
Potential impacts on periphery bond yields were examined in 3-day ‘time windows’ surrounding
each announcement.
Our empirical findings show that EFSF/ESM-related events significantly decreased govern-
ment bond yields in the eurozone periphery. That is, the creation of an EMU bailout framework
is likely to have contributed to preserving financial stability at critical moments. However, we
could establish that yields of sovereign bonds with longer maturities reacted less strongly. This
result might be attributed to quantitative easing programs and/or the relative scepticism of
investors regarding the longer-term effects of capped bailout arrangements. In this respect, the
possibility of unlimited ECB action must have been a decisive factor, facilitating a moderation in
yields after 2012.
As for the period between late 2019 and early 2020, when debates on the ESM reform were
high on the agenda, we could observe no obvious unilateral increase in bond yields for Italy.
Time will tell whether a possibly less favourable position of private investors (due to new CACs)
prompts any capital flight and a rise in periphery yields. Nonetheless, a ‘package approach’
stressed by Italy may well need to be taken into account. That is, EMU reforms should at best
come together in order to reduce the chance of unintended outcomes for the most fragile
members. A consensus on the architecture of the euro has perhaps never been as important as in
times of the coronavirus pandemic and its economic fallout. An impasse on reforms like that of
the ESM or a common deposit insurance fund may now seem to be blurred as EMU leaders have
to deal with a huge fall in economic activity. After several months of harsh debates, the ‘frugal
four’ led by the Netherlands conceded to a V750 billion package, which will see EU countries
take on joint obligations for the purpose of fighting the COVID-19 crisis. To fully benefit from
this deal, structural challenges of the euro area will also need to be addressed in the medium
term.
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ANNEX
List of events
No. Date Short description
1 11.02.2010 First indication of a possible intervention (statement of
EMU leaders)
2 25.03.2010 Statement of prospect for EU-IMF loans to Greece
3 02.05.2010 EU-IMF and Greece agree on bailout (Greek Loan
Facility)
4 09–10.05.2010 Ecofin meeting, decision about EFSM/EFSF
5 04.08.2010 Start of EFSF fully functioning
6 28–19.10.2010 European Council (EC) decides to start consultations
on a permanent resolution mechanism
7 28.11.2010 Agreement on assistance to Ireland using EFSM/EFSF
8 16–17.12.2010 EC launches Treaty revision procedure to incorporate a
permanent stability mechanism
9 25.01.2011 Landmark EFSF bond auction to facilitate Irish bailout
10 24–25.03.2011 EC agrees on establishing the ESM as a permanent
bailout fund
11 16.05.2011 Agreement on assistance to Portugal using EFSM/EFSF
12 21.07.2011 Enhancement of EFSF/ESM powers (recapitalization of
banks, intervention in secondary markets)
13 11.29.2011 Agreement on using the EFSF for Partial Protection
Certificates issued together with the beneficiary
member state's bonds (20–30% protection)
14 09.12.2011 EU leaders' statement on ESM to be brought into force
in July 2012
15 21.02.2012 Agreement on second Greek rescue package
16 09.03.2012 Agreement with creditors on Greek debt restructuring
17 20.07.2012 Loans approved for Spain to recapitalise banks,
utilizing ESM
18 27.09.2012 Establishment of ESM
19 08.10.2012 ESM commences its operations after inaugural meeting
20 12.10.2012 First batch of paid-in capital was transferred by all ESM
member states
21 01.01.2013
(continued)
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Continued
No. Date Short description
Standardized CACs kick in for new government bonds
(>1 year maturity)
22 12.04.2013 Agreement on Cypriot rescue package
23 12.07.2015 Agreement on third Greek rescue package
24 09.10.2017 Eurogroup meeting, proposal of Sch€auble on ESM and
debt restructuring
25 04.12.2018 EC approves package of measures to further strengthen
the ESM
26 14.06.2019 Announcement of Eurogroup broadly agreeing on
revised ESM Treaty
27 20.11.2019 Italian Foreign Minister publicly rejects ESM reform that
‘crushes Italy’
28 12.12.2019 Italian Premier tells Parliament ESM reform should be
adopted as part of wider financial reforms
29 04.12.2019 Eurogroup agrees in principle on elements of ESM
reform
Source: authors. Events (announcements and dates) are collected from literature quoted in Chapter 2 and
double-checked by using official EU websites (European Commission/Council, ESM).
Note: Each date in the table is considered as part of a 3-day time window (t  1, t, t þ 1) in order to capture
effects of the unfolding event (e.g. anticipations, news and official acts). For 2-day events, preceding and
subsequent days are also added accordingly.
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